Introduction
The question whether and how inequality is related to economic growth inspired a lot of empirical research over the past decade. In the early 1990s, several authors showed that higher inequality at the beginning of a longer-term period was linked to poorer growth performances (Alesina and Rodrik (1994) , Perotti (1994 Perotti ( , 1996 , Persson and Tabellini (1994) ). This resulted in a consensus that inequality worsens growth performances.
Gradually the consensus weakened. First, it was argued that the relationship differs between poor and rich countries (Deininger and Squire (1998) , Barro (1999) ). A negative relationship was found in developing countries, but for richer countries there was no relation at all.
Second, evidence was found of the opposite relationship: inequality stimulates economic growth (Forbes (2000), Arjona et al. (2001) ).
In addition, economic research becomes increasingly sceptical about empirical studies of economic growth. A decade ago, the construction of new, large scale databases raised high expectations in the empirical research of economic growth (e.g., Samuelson, 1997) . At present, however, few scholars would disagree with Durlauf (2001) ' (p. 65) . Durlauf (2001) motivates his statement by the econometric shortcomings of the early empirical work in the study of economic growth. Typical of this approach is the analysis by cross-section OLS regression where growth is regressed on several (lagged) explanatory variables as GDP, schooling, … and income inequality (Barro and Sala-I-Martin, 1995) . This analysis suffers from three major econometric problems : omitted variable bias, functional heterogeneity and endogeneity bias.
The omitted variable bias is especially problematic in growth empirics. On the one hand, the list of factors that can plausibly affect growth seems without limit. On the other hand, the (2000)). However, a new problem arises as estimation by fixed or random effects is not consistent if a lagged endogeneous variable is included in the regression (Nickell (1981) ). Growth is known to be characterised by a conditional convergence effect, which renders the fixed and random effects estimators useless for this kind of analysis. An alternative is the use of a first-difference GMM estimator (Forbes (2000) ). This estimator eliminates the country specific effects, provided that appropriate instruments are found. If the first stage relationship between the differenced independent variables and lagged level variables is weak, the GMM estimates will be biased towards their fixed-effects counterparts (Stock et al. (2002) ). In addition, Blundell et al. (2000) show that the instruments used in the first-difference GMM become less informative with series that are highly autoregressive. As inequality series are characterised by a high degree of persistence, there is a substantial risk that the GMM-results have a large finite sample bias. Durlauf and Johnson (1995) and Canova (1999) show that the assumption of parameter homogeneity in standard growth analyses is neither supported by the data, nor by theory. Park (1994) notes that although the suggestive empirical results established in the crosscountry analyses can provide a useful guide for country studies, the challenge of empirical work is testing the theoretical insights against the economic evolution of individual countries using time series data. Relevant country specific information gets lost amidst the large number of factors affecting growth performance in cross-country studies. Also Forbes (2000) calls for a within-country reassessment of the linkage between growth and inequality.
Finally, endogeneity is a major problem in growth regressions. not fully solve the endogeneity problem either, since expectations about economic growth will matter in the decision-making process with respect to schooling, investment, ...
In this paper we explore to what extent we can cope with the above problems by estimating country specific models and by testing for cointegration in a VAR-framework (Johansen and Juselius (1994) , Johansen (1995) ). While endogeneity and omitted variables still matter, the validity of the results based on the Johansen cointegration analysis depends less on their absence than the validity of results obtained by means of other methodologies.
The country specific, time series approach steers clear of the shortcomings of the usual cross-country approach:
1) By focusing exclusively on the time dimension in the data we avoid heterogeneity problems. However, we have to maintain the assumption of homogeneity over time within a country. Maddala and Wu (2000) find some limited evidence of instability over time in growth relationships.
The individual country approach is in line with Durlauf (2001) ' (p.69 ).
In addition, we steer clear of data comparability problems across countries. Atkinson and Brandolini (1999) show that, even within the so-called 'high quality' data subset of the Deininger and Squire data, comparability across countries remains problematic. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60   F  o  r  P  e  e  r  R  e  v  i  e  w   4 2) Given the major endogeneity problems in growth econometrics and the difficulty of finding adequate instruments, a vector autoregressive (VAR) model seems to be the most suitable framework for our analysis. A VAR model does not impose a priori restrictions (with respect to stationarity, causality, …) on the estimates. One exception is the assumption of a linear relationship between the different variables. This assumption is not undisputed (Banerjee and Duflo (2003) ). However, for the countries included in the application, the dispersion of most variables is limited. Given this limited range, the linearity assumption is justified.
While the VAR approach allows us to identify long run (cointegrating) relationships between the variables in the analysis, we cannot make a straightforward statement about the direction of causality. Yet by imposing overidentifying restrictions on the cointegrating vectors we can discriminate between competing models of inequality and growth, which is the essence of the inequality growth debate (Perotti, 1996) .
3) The omitted variable problem for growth regressions seems impossible to remedy.
However, contrary to previous results, it does not affect the reliability of our estimates. An omitted variable will either be stationary, in which case the estimated coefficients of the cointegrating relationship are invariant to its inclusion, or it will be non-stationary, in which case we will not be able to obtain a stable cointegrating relationship if we leave it out. The cointegration property is invariant to extensions of the information set. If cointegration between a set of variables is detected, the same cointegrating relation will be found in an enlarged variable set (Johansen, 2000) . Only if an omitted variable is strongly correlated with one of the variables in the cointegration analysis we can end up with spurious cointegration estimates (see Choi, Hu and Ogaki, 2005) 1 . On that account, we avoid ad hoc choices and only select variables that are supported by the theoretical models.
In the remaining sections of the paper we will illustrate the usefulness of our approach with an application to Belgium, Finland and the US.
1 We thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out to us (and for the useful reference). Based on the testable implications, we include income inequality, enrolment in secondary and higher education, economic growth and social security expenditure into the VAR specification. It seems plausible that the evolution of enrolment in secondary education was a driving force for economic growth at the beginning of our sample (the 1960s), but that enrolment in higher education has gradually taken over this leading role. To capture the total effect of enrolment we include both secondary and tertiary education in the estimation. Social security expenditure serves as a proxy for redistribution (see Sinn (1994) , Wigger (2001)).
Income inequality is measured by means of the gini coefficient. Consistent annual time series for the gini coefficient over a longer period of time are hard to find. We gathered the data from local data agencies and income inequality specialists. The scarcity of the inequality time series also implies that the available data do not always allow for a perfect test of the theoretical models (cf. infra). Table 1 gives an overview of the data.
<insert table 1 around here>

Unit root tests
In theory inequality measures and enrolment rates cannot be non-stationary: by definition they are bounded and cannot rise or decline forever. However, over the limited time period considered in empirical work they can resemble a unit root process (Parker (2000) ). In that case, one should handle them as such (Campbell and Perron (1991)) 2 . To test for the presence of a unit root it is important to use a regression that mimics the actual datagenerating process. If not all deterministic regressors are included, the power of the ADF-test will drop substantially. The power will also be reduced if a regressor is inappropriately added (Enders, 1995) . As we do not know the actual data-generating process, we apply the testing procedure proposed by Enders (1995, p. 256-257) . By means of the KPSS-test we check the reliability of the results of the ADF-tests that are known to have low power for highly persistent series (Kwiatkowski et al., 1992) .
<insert table 2 around here>
The unit root and stationarity tests do neither allow for a uniform nor for an unambiguous classification. E.g., the tests indicate that while the series of social security expenditure has a unit root in Belgium and the US, the Finnish counterpart seems to be trend stationary. More troublesome (although common in applied work) is that the tests are mutually inconsistent in some cases 3 . Overall, the unit root and stationarity tests indicate that non-stationarity is an additional problem one should take into account when testing for the relationship between
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK Johansen (2000), we include all variables in the cointegration analysis and perform multivariate stationarity tests to check whether a series can be excluded. Johansen (2000) supports the inclusion of stationary variables in the cointegration analysis since stationarity of an individual variable is just a special case of cointegration in which the cointegrating vector is equal to a unit vector. Since the univariate unit root tests show that some series display trending patterns we will allow for these trends in the analysis. However, Toda (1993) and Gonzalo and Lee (1998) show that Johansen's procedure is potentially flawed by the inclusion of near unit root variables in the VAR. Smallwood and Norrbin (2004) .
Cointegration analysis
From the VAR specification with lag length k results a 1 st order vector error correction model (VECM) of the following form:
We report the conclusion concerning the cointegrating rank on the basis of the maximum eigenvalue test (95% significance level) in a footnote to We initially restrict the trend to the cointegration space and leave the constant unrestricted (see Franses (2001) ). Hence, the above expression can be rewritten as:
The matrix b contains the long run (cointegrating) relationships, the matrix a the short run adjustments towards these long run equilibria.
As the time dimension of our series is limited, we cannot use asymptotic theory and need to perform small sample corrections (Johanssen (2002a (Johanssen ( , 2002b ).
Specification tests
Sumner (2004) To evaluate the appropriateness of the lag length we also test for autocorrelation in the error terms. Based on its superior behaviour in small samples we apply the F-approximation of the 5 Based on the Akaike Information Criterion we would choose 2 lags for Belgium and 3 lags for Finland. The qualitative results of the cointegrating analysis are fairly robust to these changes. .
The cointegrating rank
For the determination of the cointegrating rank we evaluate the trace statistic against its 95% asymptotic critical value. Johansen (2002a) illustrates that the actual probability of rejecting a correct null hypothesis in a finite sample is much larger than the 5% nominal value. He introduces a correction factor for the trace statistic to deal with this size distortion. Österholm (2004) shows that this procedure has a more robust performance than some alternative corrections. If we reject the null hypothesis with the asymptotic critical values, we also look at the corrected ones. In the table the corrected values are in italic. We also report the asymptotic values in brackets if the conclusion about the rank changes because of the correction.
<insert table 3 around here>
For Belgium with income after taxes, Finland and the US we do not reject the hypothesis of "two cointegrating vectors". If we would not apply the small sample correction, we would only reject the alternative hypothesis of "more than two cointegrating vectors" at levels of significance above 97,5%.
For Belgium with income before taxes we marginally reject "more than one cointegrating vector" on the basis of the corrected asymptotic values at the 95% significance level. But we do not reject this hypothesis if we look at the 90% level. An identical picture emerges if we consider the maximum eigenvalue test.
6 Belgium with inequality before taxes: ,306 (p : 0,192) ; Belgium with inequality after taxes: In the remaining part of the analysis we will assume that the assumption of "two cointegrating vectors" is appropriate in all cases.
Identification of the long term relationships
Firstly, we perform some multivariate stationarity tests. The likely (trend)stationarity of economic growth (cf. IMM1: Growth increases as enrolment increases (controlled for social security);
IMM2: Growth decreases as social security increases (controlled for enrolment).
IMM enrolment relation:
IMM3: Enrolment increases as inequality decreases (controlled for social security);
IMM4: Enrolment increases as social security increases (controlled for inequality).
CMM growth relation:
CMM1: Growth decreases as social security increases.
CMM social security relation:
CMM2: Social security increases as inequality increases.
We check with log-likelihood ratio tests whether IMM1-IMM4 or CMM1-CMM2 can be rejected.
However, the identification of multiple cointegrating vectors is not unique and changing the order in which restrictions are imposed can change the results. Therefore, we systematically explore the different sequences of restrictions. If we find both a growth and enrolment relation compatible with IMM1-IMM4 in the first step, we can argue that the data do not reject the IMM. Next we check whether the implications of the CMM are compatible with the long run relations. In table 4 we present the identified cointegrating relations.
<insert table 4 around here>
For Belgium we find that enrolment is negatively influenced by inequality before taxes.
However, the coefficient is not statistically significant and we can remove inequality from the cointegrating relation. Social security expenditure has a significant positive impact on enrolment. In the IMM redistribution matters for enrolment because it reduces (postredistribution-)inequality. Therefore, we might not detect the positive effect of redistribution Social security is negatively related to growth, which is compatible with both the IMM and the CMM. Enrolment in secondary education is positively related to growth. The impact of enrolment in higher education on growth is not significant. We cannot identify a social security relation in line with the CMM. Overall, the data for Belgium seem to be more in line with the implications of the IMM.
For the US we find that social security expenditure is positively related to income inequality, but the coefficient is only marginally significant. Enrolment in tertiary education has a strong negative impact on social security expenditure. Economic growth is positively affected by enrolment in higher education and by income inequality. The US growth relation resembles the one identified by Forbes (2000) for a panel of countries: controlled for enrolment, economic growth is positively affected by income inequality. Just as Forbes we observe a dubious impact of education. Enrolment in secondary education has a positive impact on growth, while the impact of enrolment in higher education is negative (and smaller in absolute terms). In Forbes' results the impact of education differs depending on the gender.
Social security expenditure does not have a negative impact on the growth rate. But we can neither identify a positive impact of redistribution on enrolment for the US. Hence, overall the US data seem to offer some partial support for the CMM.
For Finland we fail to identify the cointegrating vectors in terms of either the IMM or the CMM. As there exist many other theories that account for the relationship between inequality 7 According to Van den Noord and Heady (2001) the tax system in Belgium is highly progressive while the tax system in the US has only limited redistributive effects. underlines the usefulness of our country-specific approach. Next to the flexibility this approach offers in terms of the empirical specification (e.g., the inclusion of a trend in the cointegrating relation for the US and Finland, but not for Belgium), it also allows for model heterogeneity between countries.
Conclusions
Durlauf (2001) urged growth economists to advance in the field of growth econometrics. We propose a methodology that deviates in two ways from existing work: firstly, we use a time series approach instead of a cross section or panel analysis, and secondly, we resort to the Johansen cointegration framework, a methodology that, to our knowledge, has not been applied before in growth econometrics. These innovations steer clear of heterogeneity, omitted variables and endogeneity problems. We applied the methodology to the analysis of the relation between income inequality and economic growth in Belgium, the US and Finland.
The results for Belgium offer support for the IMM, while the US data seem more in line with the CMM and confirm the results of Forbes (1990) . The Finnish data do neither fit the IMM nor the CMM. The heterogeneity of our results matches the mixed results of previous cross section and panel studies. Thus, the different results of these studies are not solely caused by methodological differences but also reflect the fact that different inequality-growth models hold for different countries. A country specific estimation approach is needed since one-sizefits-all' does not apply in the field of growth empirics. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 1960 -1993 1960 -2001 1960 -1993 1960 -2001 Economic growth Changes in the log of GDP at market prices, in volume and at local currency 
Appendix: Theoretical fundaments of the estimations
We formulate the testable implications of both theories from the basic theoretical model of Bénabou (1996) and Aghion and Howitt (1998) .
Consider an overlapping generations model in which n individuals live for two periods. The intertemporal utility of an individual i born at time t is given by:
where c and d denote current and future consumption respectively. The parameter r is a measure of time preference.
The future consumption good is produced according to
where the parameterη is an efficiency measure, that is a decreasing function of the tax rate b (e.g., Lindbeck (1985 Lindbeck ( , 1988 Lindbeck ( and 1993 and Davis and Henrekson (2004) ):
(1 ) *
with * η the maximum efficiency (with zero tax rate) and 0 < k § 1.
The term k t i represents the 'society adjusted individual education level:'
where e i denotes the education level attained by an individual i and A is the basic level of knowledge and skills in the society. To increase his education level, an individual can invest in human capital (h i ), characterised by decreasing returns (e.g., Psacharopoulos, 1994 and Bils and Klenow, 2000) : 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 In the complete markets model (CMM), current consumption will be equal to the amount of initial endowments augmented with the amount of borrowing (b i ), less the amount of investment in human capital:
The government redistributes income (intra-generational transfers)by taking away a fraction b of individual income and adding a fraction b of the average income in the society ( y ) to it.
Redistribution will have an indirect cost due to its negative impact on efficiency.
Future consumption equals future production after redistribution, less the debt repayment:
(1 )
with r (>1) the (gross) market interest rate endogenously determined by the loan market clearing condition: the sum of net-borrowings must equal 0,
After substitution of (7) and (8) 
Some manipulation of the first order conditions, leads to the following expression for an individual's investment:
(1 ) 1
(1 ) (1 ) 0 1
Next we derive an expression for the steady state growth:
The partial derivative of g with respect to b is
Meltzer and Richard (1981) (see also Bénabou (1996) ) have shown that the preferred tax rate by the median voter will depend on the relative position of his income to the mean of the income distribution. The larger the gap between the median and the mean income is (i.e. the more skewed to the left the income distribution is), the higher the preferred tax rate will be.
From the results of Meltzer and Richard (1981) and (14) 
Future consumption equals production minus taxes,
The individual's maximization problem becomes (substitution of (16) and (17) into (1) 
In contrast to the perfect markets case, investment will differ across individuals. The first derivative of this expression with respect to redistribution is equal to As redistribution relaxes credit constraints, the poorly endowed (ε i sufficiently low) will invest more. The 'rich' will invest less. The higher k, the higher the 'cost' of the tax system in terms and the lower the number of people that will benefit from redistribution. Substituting (19) into (5) and taking the sum over all individuals, total education can be expressed as: 
In contrast to the CMM, the effect of redistribution on growth is ambiguous. On the one hand, a negative effect is still present through the second term of expression (22). But now there is also a positive impact through the fourth term.
From (21) and (22) we derive the testable implications of the IMM:
IMM1: Growth increases as enrolment increases (controlled for social security).
IMM2:
Growth decreases as social security increases (controlled for enrolment).
IMM3: Enrolment increases as inequality decreases (controlled for social security).
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